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Workforce development practitioners face a fundamental dilemma intheir day-to-day work: they seek to help low-skilled individuals earn adecent living in an economy that has been paying low-skilled workersless and less for nearly 30 years. Helping low-skilled workers advance inan economy with declining real wages is akin to walking up the down
escalator—what otherwise would merely be hard work becomes a daunting challenge.
Most practitioners and their participants have little choice, of course, and simply make
the best of it, adapting to labor market conditions as best they can.
Over the past few years, however, a number of organizations have developed strategies
that seek to address both issues at once, seeking to help individuals scale the escalator by
gaining skills and to change the pace of the escalator itself, making it easier for everyone
on it to move up. This two-pronged approach—helping individuals and creating “systemic”
change in a targeted industry or occupation—has been coined “sectoral employment.”
Although it appears simple enough on paper, putting sectoral employment strategies into
action quickly brings organizations face to face with the ambiguity, complexity and con-
tradictions that are the reality of the labor market. Though, from a distance, labor markets
may appear to be neat intersecting curves of supply and demand, at ground level at any
given point in time, markets are chaotic—even within a single sector. The labor market
characteristics of one sector in a single metropolis, for example, health care, are defined
by overall economic conditions; demographic trends; the policies and regulations of pub-
lic agencies at the local, state and national levels; the decisions of hundreds of large
and small employers; the capacity and quality of education and training providers; the
characteristics of the current work force; and the activities of organized labor, to name
just the obvious.
Learning about a single local economic sector takes considerable work since there is no
one source of information. And, like the well-known story about the different “visions” of
three blind men grasping an elephant, each actor’s description of the sector varies con-
siderably since each sees it from his or her own vantage point and none has the ability to
understand it entirely. Even more perplexing from the practitioner’s perspective is that key
actors often respond differently to similar market conditions. One employer may decide to
reduce reliance on workers in a particular occupation, for example, while another may
decide to add the very same kind of workers in the same occupation. Delving deeply
enough into a sector to understand it is challenging enough. Devising strategies that will
effect changes that benefit workers at the bottom of the earnings ladder may seem unre-
alistic. Yet this is precisely the aim of sectoral employment practitioners.
In meeting this challenge, sectoral employment initiatives typically narrow their target
to one or two key occupations. Depending on their organizational strengths as well as
the nature of the occupations in question, they may use a variety of strategies to effect
change, such as skills training, organizing, advocacy and business development. Despite
their variation, sectoral strategies share common characteristics and goals. In our report,
Labor Market Leverage, we noted that sectoral strategies:
 Target an occupation or cluster of occupations within an industry or sector;
 Seek to become influential actors in that sector; and
 Intervene in the sector to benefit low-income workers by connecting individuals to
better jobs and by achieving systemic changes in the labor market that more broadly
benefit workers.
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2Though the nature, aims and achievements of sectoral employment strategies are remark-
ably diverse, they tend to fall into one of two categories: they seek to alter occupations
that offer workers low pay and benefits, or they seek to expand the abilities of low-skilled
workers to qualify for good jobs that ordinarily are out of their reach.
THE SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT INITIATIVE
The term sectoral employment has been used for several years to describe the activities of a
relatively small group of organizations. In 1998, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation
launched a major philanthropic effort to test the potential of extending this strategy among
a group of 10 organizations, most of which were new to the sectoral employment field.
Gearing Up is an assessment of the first two years of a three-year initiative. After briefly
summarizing participating organizations’ strategies, the report is organized as follows:
 “WHO ARE THE SECTORAL INITIATIVE PARTICIPANTS?” describes participants’ demographic
characteristics, educational levels, labor market experience, income and assets as they
entered the sectoral programs.
 “WORKING WITH PARTICIPANTS” describes the sites’ recruitment efforts and their ability to
provide participants with training, employment opportunities and other services.
 “PROGRESS ON STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEMIC CHANGE” examines sites’ ability to mount efforts
that offer benefits to low-income workers in addition to those served directly in their
programs.
 “OBSERVATIONS ON PROGRESS TO DATE” provides an early assessment of the critical fac-
tors that have supported or inhibited the success of the overall initiative thus far.
We are not yet in a position to provide definitive conclusions about the potential of sectoral
employment, the merits of the overall initiative or the effectiveness of individual organiza-
tions; the initiative is still very much a work in progress as organizations’ programs and
strategies continue to be refined. Once the third year ends and subsequent interviews of
program participants are completed, we will be better able to address these issues.
In early 1998, 10 organizations—selected from over 200 respondents to a widely dissemi-
nated request for proposals—began work on the initiative. All shared the common char-
acteristics noted above: each targeted a sector, sought to be (or was already) an influential
actor in that sector and pursued the dual goals noted above. In many other ways, the
organizations were strikingly different from each other.
The grantees and their allies came to the initiative with a wide range of experience and
expertise, including skills training and job placement, education, housing and commu-
nity development, economic development, union organizing, business operation, com-
munity organizing and advocacy, social services, and research and policy development.
Some had years of experience in workforce development, while others had never done it
before; some had worked for years in their target sectors and were well-known as organi-
zations to be reckoned with, while others were just laying the groundwork for entry into
the sector.
GRANTEES’ SECTORAL GOALS AND STRATEGIES: SUMMARY DESCRIPTIONS
While each participating organization’s target sector and sectoral strategy are distinct in
many ways, all adopt one of two basic approaches: to increase low-income workers’ access
to good but inaccessible jobs, or to improve the low-wage, low-quality jobs that are already
held by low-income workers. The following brief summaries of the 10 organizations’ goals
and strategies are grouped within those two categories.
INCREASING ACCESS TO GOOD JOBS
ARCH seeks to create a new model of paralegal education in the District of Columbia
(D.C.), with the aim of increasing the number of low-income, African-American women
and men employed as paralegals in D.C. law firms. ARCH has worked with the Washington
Bar Association to design a year-long curriculum for local high school graduates. It also
aims to use this partnership to encourage employers to hire minorities who have com-
pleted the course and obtained certifiable skills, arguing that they will offer a stable,
mature workforce.
PhAME aims to reduce the labor shortages in precision manufacturing experienced by
firms in the Greater Philadelphia region by training members of low-income, inner-city
minority groups for these jobs. It also seeks to attract local residents and build a broader
training infrastructure by overcoming manufacturing’s poor image. Working closely with
its employer partners and local educators, PhAME has developed its own training pro-
gram in machining, which is offered in four phases over 61 weeks.
Training, Inc.’s goal is to bridge the gap between low-income minority residents of
Newark, New Jersey, and the computer industry’s need for skilled, trained workers. By
working closely with industry representatives and Essex County College (its parent institu-
tion), Training, Inc. seeks to build on its existing training for personal computer (PC)
technicians, creating options for further training as network administrators and other
more senior positions in information technology. Training, Inc. seeks to help local resi-
dents overcome barriers to training and work by addressing their academic remediation
and transportation needs, as well as preparing them for work in a business environment.
WIRE-Net aims to provide metalworking careers for low-income residents of Cleveland’s
west side and to address local industry’s shortages of entry-level and more advanced
machinists. This dual strategy involves working with local educational institutions and
metalworking employers to build training programs that meet industry needs and to
attract low-income resident participation by convincing them that skilled jobs in manufac-
turing offer strong, long-term careers. WIRE-Net has been urging the metalworking
industry and local training providers to adopt the skills standards of the National
Institute of Metalworking Skills (NIMS) and to reflect these standards in their hiring
practices and training curricula; it is also urging state government agencies to offer
stipends for metalworking training, thus ensuring that low-income residents are able to
enroll in and complete the training.
Project QUEST serves as a labor market broker, connecting San Antonio’s low-income
residents with access to higher-paying health care jobs through job training, job place-
ment and support services. QUEST partners with its two founding organizations, the
community-based Communities Organized for Public Services (COPS) and Metro
Alliance, to recruit residents in need of jobs with good wages. QUEST recruits, supports
and finds jobs for its participants while enabling them to acquire skills through accred-
ited programs provided by the Alamo Community College District. QUEST has been
working closely with the community college system to develop fast-track remediation pro-
grams and seeks to ensure high completion and graduation rates by providing trainees
with weekly counseling and other supports.
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4MAKING LOW-EARNING, LOW-BENEFIT, LOW-OPPORTUNITY JOBS BETTER
DARE spearheaded the creation of the Day Care Justice Cooperative (Co-op) of
Providence, Rhode Island, a membership organization that seeks to increase the resources
and services available to family day care providers in Rhode Island and to improve the
quality of care delivered by providers. The Co-op advocates with the state legislature and
Rhode Island’s Department of Human Services to improve compensation and recognition
for home child care providers by developing a different economic relationship between
providers and the state. It also works with its members to provide training and mentoring
programs, support for those having difficulty with state licensing and payroll issues, and
such programs as a toy lending library and a bulk purchasing program.
Working throughout the rural Arkansas delta region, the Good Faith Fund (GFF) has
launched the Careers in Health Care (CHC) program to improve the quality and reliabil-
ity of health care services delivered by certified nursing assistants (CNAs) and reduce
employers’ costs associated with training, turnover and quality control. It seeks to achieve
this by enrolling low-income, minority women leaving welfare in a high-quality, industry-
driven training program for 12 weeks (about three times the state’s current minimum
requirement) and by overcoming their significant barriers to training completion and job
retention. GFF aims to convince employers that offering higher compensation packages
for GFF graduates is cost effective, given the higher quality of service provided.
New Hampshire Community Loan Fund has facilitated the creation of Quality Care
Partners (QCP), a worker-owned company that specializes in providing reliable, high-
quality CNA services. QCP provides low-income job seekers with training that far exceeds
the state’s 100-hour minimum, and then the organization employs its graduates. It seeks
to provide employees with a minimum of 30 hours of work per week, higher-than-average
compensation and health benefits after six months. The company aims to change indus-
try practices, forcing other providers to compete against QCP’s quality and high rates of
retention, resulting in systemic change in the way low-income women are recruited,
trained, supervised and upgraded throughout the region’s health care industry. In addi-
tion, through its Paraprofessional Health Care Initiative, the Loan Fund is seeking to
raise the visibility of compensation and workforce development issues for direct-care
workers in New Hampshire.
Primavera Services, Inc., has established a day labor firm, Primavera Works, in Tucson,
Arizona, which provides day laborers with support to improve job performance and
achieve quicker job advancement. It also seeks to compete with existing for-profit labor
halls and improve day labor services to employers. Over several years, it aims to ensure
that day labor halls will pay better than minimum wages, provide steady hours, no longer
charge for rides and worker-related tools or safety equipment, and remove barriers for
employers who want to hire workers permanently.
The Temporary Worker Employment Project at Working Partnerships USA (WPUSA)
seeks to transform the temporary-help industry in California’s Silicon Valley. The project
has multiple components and strategies, including establishing and operating a nonprofit
temp agency for low-skill clerical work, developing a membership organization for tempo-
rary workers through which members can access portable benefits and training, and
mounting an advocacy campaign that attempts to set minimum fair employment standards
and practices for the temporary-help industry in general.
WHO ARE THE SECTORAL INITIATIVE PARTICIPANTS?
In many ways, the sectoral initiative participants are as diverse as the programs them-
selves. The programs’ participants differ in terms of age, race, living arrangements, edu-
cation and labor market experience. Part of this diversity reflects the nature of the
programs—in terms of what population the programs target and what they require of
potential participants, and in terms of who is attracted to the program’s services and tar-
geted sector. The primary characteristic participants have in common is that they were
living in low-income households when they enrolled in the initiative. Further, despite the
fact that many participants have some, and even significant, work experience, for the
most part, their work during the two years prior to starting a sectoral program was either
unsteady or in low-wage jobs, or both. The data that follow are based on interviews with
900 participants who enrolled during the first two years of the initiative. The interviews
were completed shortly after participants started the sectoral programs.
Though there were considerable differences by program, on the whole, participants in
the sectoral employment initiative were in their mid-30s and were likely to be either
African American or Latino. About three of every five were women, though the propor-
tion of women and men varied substantially depending on the sector. Overall, nearly half
of all participants lived with their own children, and about two-thirds lived in households
with at least one other adult who could contribute financial and other means of support
(typically a spouse or partner, and less frequently, a parent or sibling).
MOST PARTICIPANTS HAVE AT LEAST A HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA OR GED
Overall, 87 percent of participants had at least a high school diploma or general equiva-
lency diploma (GED) at program entry. This relatively high percentage reflects the
requirements of many of the sectoral programs, which seek to increase access to good
jobs by enrolling participants in college courses or other advanced training programs.
Larger percentages of participants at the Co-op (40%), Good Faith Fund (35%) and
Primavera Works (20%)—all programs that seek to improve low-quality jobs—did not
have a high school diploma or GED. Few participants had college degrees: 5 percent had
an Associate’s Degree, and 3 percent had either a Bachelor’s or Master’s Degree.
MANY PARTICIPANTS HAD STEADY FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT IN THE PAST…
Many participants had a significant amount of work experience before entering the sec-
toral initiative: 96 percent of all participants had worked in a full-time job during their
careers. About one-third had worked in the same full-time job for five years or more at
some point in their lives; two-thirds had done so for two years or more. Despite this
demonstrated ability to hold a steady job, participants had experienced difficulty finding
and retaining employment in the two years prior to entering the sectoral programs.
…YET MOST HAD BEEN UNEMPLOYED AT SOME POINT DURING THE PRIOR TWO YEARS
The majority of participants (80%) had been unemployed at some time during the two
years before starting the program, and, on average, participants had been unemployed
during nine of the previous 24 months—almost 40 percent of the time. Nine percent had
not worked at all, and 13 percent had worked only part time. Overall, 68 percent of partic-
ipants were either working when they started the program or had left a job in the three
months prior to starting the program. The rest had not worked for some time; 11 percent
had been unemployed for more than 12 months when they came to the program.
Even those participants who reported that they had worked recently had not necessarily
worked steadily. As illustrated in Figure 1, 55 percent of participants had been unem-
ployed for six months or more during the previous two years.
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6As illustrated in Figure 2, participants’ recent work experience varied by program.
Participants at the Good Faith Fund had the least amount of work experience: 23 percent
had not worked during the two years prior to program entry; 40 percent had been unem-
ployed for 19 or more of the previous 24 months. On the other hand, all of the Day Care
Justice Co-op members had been working as family child care providers. Seventy-two per-
cent of the Co-op members had been operating their businesses for at least one year; 23
percent had done so for at least five years. On average, Co-op members reported spend-
ing 48 hours per week caring for children and an additional 13 hours per week on other
tasks, such as paperwork and buying supplies for their child care businesses.
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MORE THAN HALF OF PARTICIPANTS CHANGED JOBS OR HELD MULTIPLE JOBS
AT THE SAME TIME
Another indicator of participants’ recent instability in the labor market is the number of
jobs they had in the two years prior to starting the program. More than half (54%) of the
participants had moved from job to job or worked in more than one job at the same time
to increase their earnings; 28 percent of all participants had three or more jobs during
the two-year period. Among those who had multiple jobs in the previous two years, 62
percent moved from one job to another, 20 percent worked in multiple jobs at the same
time, and 18 percent did both.
PARTICIPANTS’ MEDIAN HOURLY WAGE AT THEIR MOST RECENT FULL-TIME JOB WAS $7.00
Among participants who had worked full time in the previous two years, the average
hourly wage at their current or most recent full-time job was $8.15, and the median wage
was $7.00 per hour. Figure 3 shows the distribution of wages for participants’ current or
most recent full-time job during the two years prior to program entry. Overall, 58 percent
of participants had earned less than $7.50 per hour at their most recent full-time job, and
19 percent earned $10.00 per hour or more. The amount of time participants had
worked in their current or most recent full-time job varied greatly: 40 percent had
worked in this job for more than 12 months, while 33 percent had worked in the job for
three months or less. As illustrated in Figure 4, participants’ median hourly wages in
their current or most recent full-time jobs varied significantly by program.
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Figure 3
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MANY PARTICIPANTS SEE A LACK OF SKILLS AND EDUCATION AS
BARRIERS TO GETTING BETTER JOBS
Participants were asked about their own perceptions of barriers to getting the job they
wanted. The highest percentage of participants said that a lack of skills was either a very
important (55%) or somewhat important (22%) barrier. More than three out of five 
participants at QUEST, Training, Inc., WIRE-Net and PhAME—programs that provide
intensive training—said a lack of skills was very important. A similar percentage of 
participants said a lack of education was important. These findings suggest that many 
participants felt that they needed a postsecondary education to get the job they wanted
since most already had a high school diploma or GED. Transportation was the most often
cited barrier after a lack of skills or education, with 51 percent of participants saying it
was very or somewhat important.
ALMOST HALF OF PARTICIPANTS HAD INCOME FROM WORK IN THE PAST MONTH, 
BUT EARNINGS WERE LOW
Participants’ average income from all sources in the month prior to program entry was
$785. The median income was lower, at $560, and 64 percent of all participants had an
income of less than $800. As illustrated in Figure 5, earnings from work made up 57
percent of participants’ total income in the month prior to starting the program; govern-
ment transfers1 accounted for 30 percent of participants’ income.
In the month prior to program entry, 47 percent of participants had earnings from work.
Average earnings among those that worked were $905 for that month. Many participants
received some form of public assistance in the month prior to starting the program.
Thirty-two percent of participants received Food Stamps or other food assistance, the
primary source of noncash assistance. These participants received an average of $215 in
a Hourly wages are based on income before the deduction of taxes and expenses.
Preliminary data indicate that as much as 40 percent of Co-op members’ income
was used to cover expenses from their family day care businesses.
9Figure 5
Government cash transfers 
17%
Earnings from work 
57%
Government noncash transfers 
13%
Other income 
13%
Nonmeans-tested
62%
Means-tested
38%
Percent of Participants’ Total Income from Each
Source in the Month Prior to Program Entry
food assistance for that month. Fourteen percent of all participants, and 21 percent 
of female participants, received welfare or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), the primary source of means-tested cash assistance. On average, these partici-
pants received $285 from TANF in the month prior to program entry.
In the year before starting the program, 22 percent of the participants, who had worked
at some point in the past two years, received income from the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC). Of the participants who had worked during the past two years and who lived with
children under age 18 for whom they were primarily responsible (those most likely to be
eligible for EITC), 33 percent had received EITC in the past year. Although a few partici-
pants may have earned too much money to be eligible for EITC, these figures suggest
that many participants who were eligible did not receive the tax credit.
MOST PARTICIPANTS LIVE IN LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
The sectoral initiative participants generally lived in low-income households at program
entry. Using the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition of income,2 the median monthly house-
hold income for all participants at program entry was $1,000; and 56 percent lived below
the federal poverty line. According to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s (HUD) definition of a very low-income household,3 which is adjusted for
family size and geographic location, 77 percent of all participants lived in such house-
holds. This lack of income could be a substantial barrier to participants’ completion of
the training programs, particularly for the 45 percent of participants who were the only
income earners in their households. Table 1 shows the median monthly household
income, the percentage of households below the poverty line and the percentage of
very low-income households by program.
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Table 1
Household Income in the Month Prior to Program Entry
Program Median Monthly Percentage of Percentage of
Household Income Households Very Low-Income
Below Poverty Households
ARCH $ 626 79% 96%
Co-op $ 2,200 24% 46%
Good Faith Fund $ 335 83% 84%
PhAME $ 1,000 58% 83%
Primavera Works $ 360 80% 90%
QCP $ 1,520 31% 67%
QUEST $ 1,195 56% 76%
Training, Inc. $ 1,024 56% 87%
WIRE-Net $ 1,446 43% 70%
WPUSA $ 3,301 18% 65%
All $ 1,000 56% 77%
Figure 6
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Distribution of Net Worth for All Participants
PARTICIPANTS’ NET WORTH IS TYPICALLY ZERO
Overall, the sectoral initiative participants’ median net worth—the difference between
the value of their assets and their debts—at program entry was $0.4 For 39 percent of all
participants, the total amount of their debts exceeded the value of their assets, resulting
in a negative net worth. At only four programs (WIRE-Net, QCP, WPUSA and the Co-op)
was participants’ median net worth greater than $0, ranging from $301 to $3,910. Figure
6 shows the distribution of net worth for all participants. To put these figures into per-
spective, according to the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, the median net worth for
all U.S. families was $71,600 (Kennickell et al., 2000).5
The percentage of participants who held any assets at program entry was 66 percent.
Table 2 provides a summary of the assets held by participants and the median values of
those assets. The most common asset participants held was a vehicle, with 41 percent of
all participants reporting that they owned an automobile or motorcycle. Automobile own-
ership varied significantly by program, from 11 percent at Primavera Works to 87 percent
at QCP, where participants are required to have transportation for their work. Only 16
percent of all participants owned a home; the home ownership rate was highest (55%)
among Co-op members.
Table 2
Assets of the Sectoral Initiative Participants
Asset Percentage of Participants Median Value for 
Holding Asset Participants
Holding Asset
Any asset 66% $ 3,000
Automobile 41% $ 3,150
House 16% $ 65,000
Other real estate 3% $ 1,800
Business assets 1% $ 1,300
Checking account 38% $ 200
Savings account 31% $ 295
Cash not kept in a bank account 14% $ 200
IRA or other retirement fund 6% $ 2,000
Stocks or bonds 5% $ 575
Other assets 9% $ 2,500
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The percentage of participants with any debt at program entry was 68 percent. Programs
in which more participants held assets also tended to be the ones where more partici-
pants had debts. Credit card balances were the most common type of debt. Twenty-one
percent of all participants had educational loans, with the largest percentages at ARCH
and QUEST. Although 41 percent of participants owned an automobile, only 15 percent
had an automobile loan. This, along with the fact that the median value of participants’
vehicles was $3,150, suggests that many participants had older vehicles that may not have
been reliable for getting to work. Thirteen percent of male participants reported having
outstanding child support or alimony payments. Table 3 provides a summary of partici-
pants’ debts and the median value of those debts.
Table 3
Debts of the Sectoral Initiative Participants
Debt Percentage of Participants Median Value of
Holding Debt Participants’ Debt
Any debt 68% $ 3,900
Credit card balance 36% $ 1,280
Educational loan 21% $ 3,500
Automobile loan 15% $ 5,000
Home mortgage 12% $ 50,000
Outstanding child support or alimony 6% $ 4,000
Business debt 1% $ 1,200
Other debt, such as medical bills 
or overdue utility bills 34% $ 700
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CONCLUSION
Participants entering the Sectoral Employment Initiative were in some ways considerably
better off than other groups, such as long-term welfare recipients or ex-offenders, who
are often the focus of public sector workforce development programs. Initiative partici-
pants had, by and large, played by the rules: nearly all had a high school degree or its
equivalent and had held a full-time job. In fact, two-thirds had held the same full-time job
for at least two years at some point in their careers. And only one out of seven partici-
pants was on TANF when entering the program.
Yet their work lives unfolded very much on the periphery of the labor market. Although
a substantial majority had been able to find full-time employment during the two years
before program entry, more than half had been unemployed for at least six months dur-
ing that time. And their employment tended to be sporadic: among the participants who
had worked, nearly three out of five had moved from job to job (and often to a third job)
during their recent labor market history. While many participants had been able to find
full-time employment, the majority earned less than $7.50 an hour and nearly 40 percent
earned below $6.25 an hour.
Given their erratic employment and low wages, it is not surprising that participants’
incomes were also very low. Since nearly half were the principal wage earners in their
households, the lack of income put their entire family at considerable risk. Participants
had little to fall back on when they entered the program: low wages and unsteady work
had prevented them from accumulating much in the way of financial assets; in fact, their
median net worth was precisely zero.
In sum, this is a group of workers that appears to be both in need of employment assis-
tance and well positioned to benefit from it. They have basic educational credentials and
a demonstrated ability to find employment. They have had considerable trouble staying
employed and moving up. Most recognize they need additional education and skills in
order to achieve greater success in the labor market, implying that they are well suited
for the services offered by several of the participating organizations.
WORKING WITH PARTICIPANTS
This section examines the programs’ work with their participants. The sites spent much
of their time in the first two years of the initiative developing their programs to serve
individual participants. Evolving public policy, the strength of the national economy and
changes in the sectors in which they work all affected the sites’ ability to enroll, retain
and place participants. In addition, the challenges of developing, staffing and managing
programs weighed heavily on their capacity to serve clients successfully.
In this portion of the report, we have grouped the 10 organizations by programmatic
approach. First, we examine the work of the seven organizations whose principal program
intervention is based on training: ARCH, PhAME, WIRE-Net, Training, Inc., Project
QUEST, the Good Faith Fund (GFF), and Quality Care Partners (QCP). We then examine
the achievements of Primavera Works, Working Partnerships USA (WPUSA) and the Day
Care Justice Cooperative (Co-op), whose main strategies are business development, mem-
bership services and advocacy. The data in this section are based on reports submitted by
the programs.
THE TRAINING SITES
PROGRAM ENROLLMENT
Total enrollment across the seven training sites during the first two years of the initiative
was 788. As shown in Table 4, enrollment varied considerably across the sites. Project
QUEST, Training, Inc.6 and PhAME each enrolled over 140 participants. GFF enrolled
just over 100 participants, and WIRE-Net enrolled 86. QCP and ARCH enrolled fewer
participants than anticipated, 46 and 44, respectively.
A number of challenges affected recruitment and enrollment at many sites during Year
One. Sites struggled to deal with external factors that were often beyond their control.
In New Hampshire, QCP faced a tight labor market for health care professionals. In
Arkansas and Washington, D.C., GFF and ARCH faced welfare policies that inhibited the
women targeted from participating in training programs. To varying success, sites looked
internally at ways to redesign their recruitment and intake strategies to increase enroll-
ment. Sites’ ability to improve enrollment depended on the ingenuity of staff as well as
on the strength of the programs as perceived by would-be participants. GFF more than
doubled enrollment between the first and second years, largely because of improvements
in marketing the programs, and in providing supportive services to help participants
attend training.
ARCH continued to struggle with recruitment, and PhAME’s enrollment numbers
dropped significantly in the second year. Both programs require a significant investment
of time—12 months or more of full-day training—and had difficulty recruiting people
who were both willing and able to make the investment. Both were relatively new pro-
grams that could not rely on past success stories to convince people in the communities
they serve that the investment was worthwhile.
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Table 4
Program Participation and Outcomes for Participants Enrolled During Program Years One and
Two as of November 2000
Enrolled Percentage Percentage Percentage Mean Median
Still in Who of Graduates Starting Starting
Training Graduated Placeda Wage Wage
ARCH 44 0% 32% 64% $ 10.12 $ 9.00
Good Faith Fund 107 0% 55% 97% $ 5.84 $ 5.75
PhAME 211 0.4% 12% 85% $ 11.12 $ 11.00
QCPb 46 0% 93% 86% $ 8.50 $ 8.50
QUEST 152 53% 17% 85% $ 11.89 $ 11.50
Training, Inc. 142 0% 77% 83% $ 12.38 $ 11.00
WIRE-Net Introc 23 0% 78% 72% $ 7.58 $ 7.00
WIRE-Net Advancedc 63 0% 68% 77% $ 9.76 $ 9.00
All 788 10% 43% 84% $ 9.73 $ 8.50
a Job placement figures were reported by the programs and do not include employment of participants who
dropped out. The follow-up survey will provide more complete postprogram employment data.
b QCP’s job placements include only participants who worked for QCP after completing training.
c WIRE-Net Intro refers to the program’s eight-week training programs. WIRE-Net Advanced refers to the
program’s six- to nine-month training programs sponsored by NASA, Polaris, Cuyahoga Community
College and Cleveland’s Adult Education Program at Max Hayes High School.
PROGRAM COMPLETION
By November 2000, 419 participants, or 53 percent of all people who enrolled during 
the first two years, had either graduated or were still in training; 47 percent had either
dropped out or been terminated before training completion. Data provided by the sites
suggest that 44 percent of participants who left the sectoral training programs were ter-
minated by the program owing to a lack of attendance or some other cause. The other 56
percent of noncompleters dropped out for a variety of reasons, including personal and
family crises, the need to obtain a job to support themselves and their families, and the
realization that the type of work they were training for was not suited to them. As sites
improved their screening processes and the services they provide to support participants
during the training, the overall completion and in-program retention rate improved from
42 percent in Year One to 65 percent in Year Two.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between program completion rates and the length of
training across the seven training sites in the first two program years. The length of time
required to complete training varied substantially among the seven sites—from approxi-
mately four weeks at QCP to an average of 18 months at Project QUEST. One would intu-
itively expect that longer programs, in general, would have lower graduation rates. In
Figure 7, we ran a simple linear regression to fit a line to the data to show the relation-
ship between the completion rate and length of training. The regression line shows that
expected program completion rates decrease as the length of training increases. However,
less than half of the variation in the completion rate can be explained by differences in
the length of training. As described in the following paragraphs, many other program-
matic factors influenced whether participants completed training.
Project QUEST offers the longest training program, ranging from one to two years, and
it had a much higher program retention and graduation rate than did the other year-
long training programs. By November 2000, 51 percent of the participants enrolled in
QUEST in Year One and 84 percent of those enrolled in Year Two had either graduated
or were still in training. QUEST attributes its low attrition to careful pre-enrollment
screening and good case management, which includes assistance with securing financial
aid. QUEST helps its participants obtain Pell grants, an essential source of financial sup-
port. QUEST participants are thoroughly integrated into the community college student
body, and, thanks to weekly group case management sessions, there is a strong sense of
loyalty and mutual support among them.
The GFF staff focused considerable attention on reducing attrition during both the first
and second years. After a thorough analysis of program data, staff concluded that attri-
tion was the result of such factors as acceptance of candidates whose remediation needs
were beyond the program’s capacity to address the length and scope of the certified nurs-
ing assistant (CNA) training curriculum, and a lack of support services for participants
and their families. From Year One to Two, GFF implemented a more rigid screening
process, changed the CNA curriculum to make it more hands-on, and worked with the
state human service agency to provide 24-hour transportation assistance for individuals
in training as well as those starting to work. Finally, GFF succeeded in persuading the
Department of Human Services to have child care in place for TANF recipients before
program enrollment. The changes appear to have contributed to significant improve-
ments. GFF’s program completion rate increased from 41 percent in Year One to 62 per-
cent in Year Two, even as the number of people enrolled doubled. Going into the third
year, GFF was considering shortening the CNA training from 12 to 8 weeks.
Only 53 percent of the 15 participants in WIRE-Net’s advanced training programs gradu-
ated in Year One. At the beginning of the second program year, WIRE-Net modified its
recruitment strategy and hired new staff to provide support to participants while they
were in training. In Year Two, WIRE-Net enrolled three times as many people in its
advanced training programs, and the completion rate increased to 73 percent.
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Figure 7
Program Completion Rate by Length of Training, 
Program Years One and Two
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PhAME and ARCH were significantly challenged by attrition. At ARCH, only 32 percent
of its 44 participants completed the program. ARCH staff attribute the attrition to the dif-
ficulty participants had in supporting themselves and their families while attending the
training. During a pilot program, ARCH enrolled welfare recipients who continued to
receive their cash assistance while attending the year-long training. However, by the time
the sectoral initiative began, welfare policies had changed, and welfare recipients were
told that they could not attend training and continue to receive assistance. Even after the
District of Columbia allowed the ARCH training to count as a work activity, few people
were referred to the program. Many of those who did enroll soon realized that the $35
weekly stipend was not enough.
At PhAME, only 15 percent of the 155 participants enrolled in Year One completed the
full 61 weeks of training. Two months into the initiative, PhAME lost funding for stipends
for its program participants, and, with no alternative in place, attrition increased precipi-
tously. In Year Two, staff made several adjustments to strengthen support services, but
attrition continued to be a problem: by November 2000, only 5 percent of the 56 Year
Two enrollees had graduated or were still in training. At the end of Year Two, PhAME’s
staff decided to shorten the training schedule, which had been 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.
every day. The restructured schedule runs from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. daily, enabling
participants to hold part-time jobs.
PhAME offers its 61-week training in four phases and provides placement services to par-
ticipants that complete any one of the phases. During the Prep phase, which takes place
over the first eight weeks of the program, participants learn basic verbal, math and com-
puter skills. Fifty-six percent of participants that enrolled during the first two program
years completed at least the Prep phase. Participants then enter the five-week Vestibule
phase, during which they are introduced to the manufacturing process; 47 percent of
participants completed at least the Vestibule phase. Participants begin working with the
machinery and take additional technical classes during the third, or Core, phase. During
the first two years, 22 percent of PhAME’s participants completed the Core phase of the
training. Data provided by PhAME suggest that participants can obtain relatively well-pay-
ing jobs after completion of the Vestibule and Core phases, which could be a significant
factor in explaining the program’s high rate of attrition.
PLACEMENT RATES
As indicated in Table 4, program graduates appear to have been well prepared for the
labor market, with 84 percent finding employment after completing their training.
Though attrition has been higher than anticipated, those who are completing the pro-
grams are attractive to employers.
Placement rates were generally high during the first two years among the health care
training programs for certified nursing assistants (CNAs) and home health aides. GFF
had the highest placement rate across the initiative, with 97 percent of its graduates from
Years One and Two obtaining employment. QCP employs its own program graduates, so
one might expect the placement rate to be high. In fact, 86 percent of the program’s
graduates obtained jobs as health care professionals through QCP. QUEST placed 85 
percent of its graduates from both program years.
Training, Inc. placed 83 percent of its graduates from Years One and Two. Placement
rates among the two manufacturing training programs varied slightly. WIRE-Net placed
75 percent of its graduates across all of its programs, 72 percent of the introductory 
training graduates and 77 percent of the advanced training graduates. PhAME has had
considerable success, placing 85 percent of the graduates of its 61-week manufacturing
training program. PhAME placed a much smaller percentage (38%) of the participants
who completed an earlier phase of the training and left the program. However, the place-
ment rate increases with each phase of the training completed: 16 percent of Prep com-
pleters, 36 percent of Vestibule completers and 62 percent of Core completers were
placed by the program.
STARTING WAGES
In contrast to job placement rates, which were consistently high across the seven training
programs, starting wages differed widely. Overall, graduates’ median starting wage was
$8.50 per hour compared with a median of $7.00 at their last job prior to entering one
of the sectoral programs. Median wages by site ranged from $5.75 to $11.50 per hour.
Initial wages depended considerably on the sector targeted and on the occupation within
the sector. For example, graduates of the three health care programs earned very differ-
ent starting wages. Graduates of GFF’s CNA program earned a median hourly wage of
$5.75 in their first jobs, while QCP graduates earned a median hourly wage of $8.50.
(This wage differential is, in part, a result of the lower cost of living of GFF graduates in
Arkansas.) QUEST graduates earned significantly more—a median wage of $11.50 per
hour—because its graduates qualify for higher-skilled health care jobs, such as licensed
vocational nurses and laboratory technicians.
Training, Inc. graduates had the highest average starting wages, $12.38 per hour, reflect-
ing the high wages of the information technology sector and the demand for new skills.
The graduates of the manufacturing programs also earned among the highest wages. 
At PhAME, graduates of the 61-week program earned a median hourly wage of $11.00.
Median wages were similar among PhAME participants who completed earlier phases 
of the training and left the program. While those who left after the first phase earned 
a lower median hourly wage ($9.00), those who left after Vestibule and Core earned
$10.99 and $10.50 per hour, respectively. At WIRE-Net, graduates of the advanced train-
ing programs earned higher median hourly wages ($9.00) than did graduates of the
introductory training programs ($7.00).
CAREER ADVANCEMENT
Several of the sites began to develop career advancement and skills upgrading strategies
for their participants—both as a means to improve the wages of graduates and to attract
and keep new program participants. Training, Inc. planned to encourage its graduates to
pursue additional training in Essex County College’s computer programs and, by Fall
2000, 31 of its 109 graduates were enrolled in an advanced certification or degree pro-
gram. In response to employer demand for workers with A+ certification, in Spring 2000,
Training, Inc. opened an on-site certification center to help program graduates, faculty
and other area residents keep their skills current with changes in technology.
PhAME program graduates have earned up to 24 credit hours toward an Associate’s
Degree in manufacturing technology at one of the program’s academic partners, the
Community College of Philadelphia. WIRE-Net is developing career ladders in manufac-
turing, and GFF and Project QUEST are doing so in health care. In Fall 2000, seven of
GFF’s graduates were enrolled in post-program training and education.
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THE NONTRAINING SITES
The three other programs—Primavera Works, Working Partnerships USA and the Day
Care Justice Co-op—developed a wide range of services to individuals, including employ-
ment, health insurance, membership services and advocacy. Since each organization’s
strategy is unique, each will be examined in turn.
PRIMAVERA WORKS
Primavera Works’ strategy centers on the creation of a day labor business that will offer
concrete evidence that day labor firms can provide higher-quality services to employers
while paying higher wages than the current rate in Tucson. At the start of the initiative,
Primavera Works expected to place 45 participants in its day labor pool in Year One.
Participants would work for Primavera between 25 and 30 hours a week, with an average
hourly wage of 100 to 105 percent of the minimum wage. By Year Two, Primavera
expected to place 65 participants, with an average hourly wage of 110 to 115 percent of
the minimum wage. Primavera projected that 60 percent of participants that worked with
them for at least one month would find stable, better-paying employment after they left
the program.
On most measures, Primavera has met and in several instances exceeded its program
goals. By the end of Year One, it had employed 68 workers and, in Year Two, an addi-
tional 215 people. The average hourly wage of its workers in both years was $5.44, or 106
percent of the minimum wage.7 Most participants were employed by the program for a
short time: 69 percent were employed by Primavera Works for one month or less; 22 per-
cent for two to three months; 7 percent for four months or more. Of the 283 participants
employed by Primavera Works during the first two program years, 43 percent left
Primavera for work with another employer.8
Business clients report that Primavera’s participants are better prepared and have 
fewer problems than do workers from other day labor halls. The staff believe that 
the program’s strength lies in the range of support services, including shelter and 
transitional housing, offered through Primavera Works and its parent organization,
Primavera Services.
WORKING PARTNERSHIPS USA
WPUSA’s sectoral strategy focuses on improving the wages, benefits and overall employ-
ment conditions of temporary workers in the Silicon Valley. To meet this goal, WPUSA’s
sectoral strategy has four elements: to develop a temporary help staffing agency, to offer
office skills training and certification to temporary workers, to create a membership
organization for temp workers, and to develop and encourage the adoption of a code of
conduct by temp agencies in the Silicon Valley. WPUSA entered the initiative with ambi-
tious expectations for the growth and implementation of these four complementary
strategies but quickly discovered that managing day-to-day program operations and devel-
oping a workable business strategy hindered its efforts to advance all four planks and to
assist the large number of temporary workers projected.
Staffing Agency. By the end of Year One, WPUSA expected to launch its staffing agency
and to place 250 temporary workers, with 75 percent in jobs paying at least $10.00 per
hour. In Year Two, it expected 25 percent of the agency’s temps to have wage increases 
of at least 5 percent. In the end, the work of launching the staffing business took much
longer than expected, and Year One was devoted entirely to planning. From the opening
of the staffing agency in Spring 1999 through March 2000, Working Partnerships Staffing
Service (WPSS) operated at very low levels, placing a total of 29 clients. On average, four
clients worked per month for an average of three days a week. Most of the temporary
assignments paid $10.00 per hour or more, though the wages on some assignments were
subsidized by WPSS to meet its commitment to its workers. In early 2000, a consultant
from the temp industry was brought on board to further develop the agency’s strategy,
and, in April 2000, WPUSA hired a branch manager to run the agency.
Membership Organization. WPUSA proposed to create a membership organization of 1,000
temporary workers and to provide portable health and pension benefits to half of the
members, as well as workers’ rights education and job placement services to all. By the
end of the second program year, just under 50 people had joined the membership organ-
ization, Working Partnerships Member Association (WPMA). Membership activities con-
sisted of monthly membership meetings, workshops, a Temp Worker Stories Project and
access to computer lab time at WPUSA. The number of people participating in these
activities was small, ranging from two to nine per month. WPUSA negotiated a portable
health insurance plan for temporary workers with Kaiser Permanente, though no one
had enrolled by March 2000. WPUSA reported several obstacles: some potential appli-
cants reported feeling overwhelmed by the paperwork involved, others did not meet the
program’s income eligibility requirement, and still others were eligible but were passed
over by Kaiser employees who had not been trained to recognize the WPUSA health
insurance program.
Office Skills Training. WPUSA originally proposed that 75 percent of its temp workers
would complete a certification program for clerical workers by the end of Year One. Like
the staffing agency and membership organization, the training strategy also progressed
slowly. During Year One, WPUSA focused on developing and finding a home for its train-
ing strategy and, in late 1998, signed an agreement with Mission Community College to
run the certification classes. WPUSA staff reported that recruiting clients for the classes
through its staffing agency had been difficult. During the first two program years, 18 peo-
ple enrolled in the classes, but only four were WPSS employees. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that WPSS temps were too advanced for the Mission program, and staff plan to
create better links for them to Mission’s advanced computer programs.
DAY CARE JUSTICE CO-OP
The Day Care Justice Co-op’s key sectoral goal is to improve the working conditions
and income of family child care providers in Providence. Direct Action for Rights and
Equality (DARE), the Co-op’s founding agency, developed the strategy to create a mem-
bership organization of family day care providers that would advocate for improved work-
ing conditions and higher reimbursement rates from the state. Members participate 
in advocacy efforts and, in return, have access to services and programs designed to
improve their working conditions and raise the quality of care they provide to the chil-
dren and families they serve.
According to DARE’s proposal, by the end of Year One, the Co-op would have 75 mem-
bers, increasing to 100 by the end of Year Two. The Co-op started the initiative with
about 55 members and, by March 2000, there were 93. Attendance at monthly meetings
throughout the second program year ranged from 20 to 53 members. Co-op members
also participated in subcommittee and ad hoc meetings, including sessions to organize
against a proposal by the Rhode Island Department of Human Services (RIDHS) to
establish an electronic funds transfer system for family day care providers.
DARE’s original proposal envisioned access to in-house and external training on such
elements as health care and first aid, CPR certification, curriculum development, and
record keeping. DARE also proposed to develop five programs: peer mentoring, bulk
purchasing, a parental referral system, a toy lending library and a microloan program.
The development of the Co-op’s programmatic capacity progressed significantly more
slowly than originally anticipated. This can be attributed to two main factors. First, estab-
lishing the Co-op as a freestanding nonprofit, independent of DARE, became the over-
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riding focus of the first year and a half of work. Second, it took the Co-op longer than
anticipated to develop basic administrative, management and operational capacity,
including hiring staff, securing office space and obtaining office equipment. As a result,
by the end of Year Two, the mentoring program, bulk purchasing program, substitute
pool program and toy lending library were still under development.
The Co-op has negotiated a contract with the state that will enable the Co-op to provide
its members up to 10 days of vacation and sick day coverage. The contract is one of the
first of its kind in the nation and is of considerable interest to other family day care
providers and advocates around the country.
The Co-op started offering in-house training sessions during the second program year,
and, by the end of this period, the sessions had increased in both number and attendance.
In Winter/Spring 2000, 14 training sessions were offered, with attendance ranging from
18 to 57 members each time. In addition, through an agreement with ChildSpan, a local
nonprofit that specializes in child care training, six Co-op members were enrolled in a
year-long accreditation program for their family day care businesses; two members were
seeking re-accreditation. The number of Co-op members participating in any program or
meeting each month increased steadily from 25 in May 1999 to over 70 a year later.
CONCLUSION
Despite a slow start for some, all 10 participating organizations have launched programs
to serve individuals during the first two years of the demonstration. And while some
organizations certainly operated at low levels, most expanded steadily during the two-year
period, no small achievement when exceptionally tight labor markets made recruitment
such a challenge.
One important concern for the seven organizations that focus on training is the 47 per-
cent dropout rate. Examination of performance by site indicates that disproportionate
attrition occurred at two programs, ARCH and PhAME, both of which have very long
training programs that were beset by various difficulties. Attrition at the other five sites
was considerably lower, just over 29 percent in aggregate. Since one key factor in partici-
pants’ attrition is their need for income, longer-term programs (more than six months)
must ensure that participants have the financial capacity to stay in training and that the
ultimate payoff for program completion is significantly higher than if participants drop
out and take a job.
Graduates of the seven training programs appear well prepared for the labor market:
nearly 85 percent found employment soon after completing the training. Perhaps most
promising is the fact that those completed the training programs earned $8.50 an hour
at placement compared with $7.00 an hour at their most recent job during the two years
before entering the program. Since income gains that result from most employment
programs stem principally from more hours worked and not from increased wages, such
hourly wage gains are impressive.
Progress at the nontraining sites—Primavera, Working Partnerships USA and the Day Care
Justice Co-op—has been uneven. Primavera has demonstrated the capacity to quickly
launch a competitive (albeit subsidized) day labor firm that has exceeded most of its oper-
ating goals. However, its effect on individual workers is unclear, since they are paid near
the minimum wage and the vast majority stay with Primavera for a very short time.
WPUSA and the Co-op got off to slow starts for various reasons. While activity definitely
picked up toward the end of the second year, each was still in the process of implement-
ing its programs for individual participants, making it difficult to draw conclusions about
their effectiveness at this point.
PROGRESS ON STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEMIC CHANGE
By definition, sectoral employment strategies aim to achieve more than simply helping
the participants in their programs. Rather, they seek to alter the labor markets in which
they operate in order to benefit workers throughout the sector. The dramatic nature of
these strategies should not be overstated; in most circumstances, they will be modest and
incremental. However, these modest changes do have the potential to affect the lives of
many workers well beyond those enrolled in the immediate program. For example, if an
organization is able to convince the local community college to offer a new occupational
degree that responds to employers’ needs, all students who enroll will benefit. Or if a
workforce development organization persuades employers to offer training to their entry-
level workers, people beyond those placed by the program will have the opportunity to
strengthen their skills.
Over the past two years, each of the 10 organizations participating in the Sectoral
Employment Initiative has increased its knowledge about the occupations targeted, devel-
oped allies (and occasional opponents) and refined its strategies. The importance of
developing a full understanding of the chosen sector cannot be overemphasized. Labor
markets are extraordinarily complex systems, whose outcomes are affected (even in the
simplest terms) by myriad large and small employers, staffing agencies, government regu-
lations and contracts, educational institutions, and workers operating in a local market
within a regional, national and increasingly international context. While focusing on a
particular occupation or set of occupations within a sector narrows the target, it still takes
time to develop sufficient knowledge and institutional credibility to begin to effect change.
So, after two years, one should not expect the participating organizations to have
achieved significant impact. On the other hand, one would expect that by this time the
grantees would have developed a clear set of strategies and concrete operational steps
that position them to effect change within their sectors.
EARLY SUCCESSES
A few of the sites were able to effect change during the first two years. GFF hired a full-
time policy advocate to work with legislators in Little Rock as they fashioned the state’s
welfare policies. As one of the only employment training programs in the state for
women leaving welfare, GFF brought considerable expertise to the table. In addition,
GFF brought employers to the table—something that other Arkansas organizations
seemed unable to do—which substantially increased its credibility with elected officials.
GFF’s reputation and partners, as well as the fact that Arkansas legislators have few staff,
has enabled the organization to draft provisions approved for the state’s TANF legislation
that allow participation in employment training to fulfill welfare recipients’ work obliga-
tion. In addition, when GFF saw that many of its program participants did not have access
to reliable transportation, it worked with the county to allow TANF funds to be used to
help people purchase cars so they could get to work. The program has now been
expanded statewide.
GFF has also been working to make local community colleges more accessible to the
women the program serves. One college has revamped its remedial education program
to admit people with low reading and math skills who used to be turned away. GFF’s rela-
tionship with the community colleges is also benefiting its participants directly. Phillips
County Community College now grants GFF’s graduates preferred admission to its allied
health programs.
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Toward the end of Year Two, Primavera Works became actively engaged in pushing state
legislation that would have increased the regulation of the day labor industry in order to
change certain practices that Primavera felt were taking advantage of workers. While the
original bill did not pass, a more limited version did; it prevents day labor firms from
charging fees when they cash workers’ checks.
Before the Sectoral Employment Initiative began, DARE had established itself as a formi-
dable organizing entity on behalf of family child care providers and had successfully
negotiated state-sponsored family health insurance on their behalf—making Rhode
Island the first state to do so. It has also been active with regard to provider reimburse-
ment rates, in particular, in defeating an effort to rescind scheduled rate increases.
IN POSITION TO EFFECT CHANGE
Several organizations have clear visions of sectoral change and are developing allies and
“strategic” positions. WIRE-Net has been instrumental in establishing the Northeast Ohio
Metalworking Association Partnership (NEO-MAP), which is composed of WIRE-Net, the
Greater Cleveland Growth Association’s Industry Cluster project and three manufacturing
trade associations: the Cleveland chapter of the National Tooling and Machining
Association, the Precision Metalforming Association, and the Precision Machined Products
Association. Together they represent 600 manufacturing firms. The Partnership aims to
encourage the educational system to increase the number of skilled manufacturing gradu-
ates and to improve their training by emphasizing formally recognized skills standards.
Through the end of the second year, some employees of Cuyahoga Community College
were resistant to WIRE-Net’s efforts on both of these fronts, but the engagement of these
major employer groups has substantially increased WIRE-Net’s leverage.
The New Hampshire Community Loan Fund and Quality Care Partners have established
themselves as important players in issues affecting workers in New Hampshire’s health
care sector. The Loan Fund has worked hard to cultivate good relationships with senior
state policymakers, particularly in the Department of Health and Human Services. This
resulted, at least in part, from the Loan Fund’s organizing for state officials several focus
groups of CNA and home health aides. These informal alliances with public officials have
led to the formation of a state working group focused on the needs of the direct care
workforce that includes health care workers, child care workers and workers who assist
people with disabilities. The Loan Fund and QCP were also able to secure appointments
of people to the New Hampshire Work Opportunity Council (the state Workforce
Investment Board) who can represent the workforce concerns of the health care
staffing industry.
Though Working Partnerships USA has yet to implement many of the major components
of its initiative, it has been very successful in highlighting the concerns of low-wage work-
ers in the temporary staffing industry. WPUSA’s staffing industry initiative has received
considerable local and national media coverage, sensitizing policymakers in San Jose and
Sacramento to the needs of workers. Its report, Walking the Lifelong Tightrope, describes how
economic changes in California are simultaneously increasing income inequality and eco-
nomic insecurity. Written in conjunction with the Economic Policy Institute, the report
concludes with a series of policy recommendations for ameliorating both of these trends.
WPUSA has also developed a code of conduct that would require staffing firms employ-
ing former welfare recipients to agree to a set of standards on wage and health insurance
coverage. The code was presented to the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors for
consideration toward the end of Year Two.
STILL DEVELOPING SECTORAL STRATEGIES
Project QUEST and Training, Inc. devoted most of the first two years of the initiative to sus-
taining and expanding their services to individuals and less to pursuing specific sectoral
strategies. In part, this reflects the fact that these organizations train relatively large num-
bers of individuals compared with other organizations in the initiative, and they appear to
have mounted high-performing programs. (Each organization trains several hundred peo-
ple per year—only a subset of whom are in the sectors targeted for this initiative.)
In addition to managing the various programs, Training, Inc.’s executive director has
taken on additional responsibility within Essex County College by serving on several
committees and, as the third year began, by taking on responsibility for managing 
the college’s customized training programs with private employers and its work-first,
job-preparation programs, each of which works with several hundred participants annu-
ally. During the second year, Training, Inc. also began negotiations to become one of
Newark’s eight One-Stop Centers. These new endeavors speak to the strong reputation
Training, Inc. holds with the college and the city, but they have also reduced staff’s ability
to pursue sectoral plans with the college’s Center for Technology to increase recruitment
and improve graduation rates.
QUEST has also been expanding recruitment as a result of a near doubling of the City of
San Antonio’s financial support in 2000. Since the strong local economy had already
reduced QUEST’s traditional recruiting pipeline, this expansion has, and continues to
require, considerable staff attention. As QUEST moves into the third year of the initia-
tive, it has begun fashioning a mobility strategy with local health care employers that will
accelerate the training and promotion of workers into more highly skilled and higher
paid positions.
PhAME and ARCH have been challenged throughout the two years of the initiative in
their efforts to serve individuals and to pursue sectoral change. Both organizations have
focused principally on recruiting and training individuals rather than on effecting sys-
temic change in the sector. In part, this focus stemmed from an explicit strategic choice:
each organization essentially banked on its ability to demonstrate to employers and other
educational institutions that it was possible to recruit local, mostly minority, candidates
who, once trained, would perform as well or better than other candidates. Once poor
recruitment and high attrition combined to severely curtail the number of graduates, this
strategy failed to influence outside institutions.
ARCH is now convinced that it will not be able to mount a successful paralegal training
program on its own and, as the third year began, was developing a relationship with the
University of the District of Columbia to take over the training. ARCH continues to be
responsible for the recruitment and job preparation of candidates. If successful, this
transition could achieve the broader sectoral goals that ARCH originally envisioned by
encouraging a major local educational institution to begin a paralegal training program
that would be accessible to District of Columbia residents.
PhAME’s programmatic difficulties have precluded the development of a clear sectoral
strategy to this point. However, by collaborating with the Community College of
Philadelphia, PhAME was able to promote the creation of an Associate’s Degree in
manufacturing technology, which, at the college’s request, was designed by PhAME’s
executive director. In the meantime, PhAME’s board and staff have been primarily
focused on restructuring the training program, boosting recruitment and stabilizing
the organization’s funding.
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OBSERVATIONS ON PROGRESS TO DATE
Though the initiative started slowly, activity picked up and performance improved
markedly through the second year. By the end of Year Two, most participating organiza-
tions had mounted what appear to be well-structured and sound programs serving indi-
viduals—several hundred people in all. Progress on systemic change components has
been slower than development of services to individuals, as expected. Although some of
the organizations appear well positioned to effect systemic change, others are not as far
along as had been planned. Several factors, some related to the organizations themselves
and others to the terrain in which they operate, contributed to the achievements (or lack
of them) to date.
THE LACK OF TIME FOR PLANNING LED TO A SLOW START
The purpose of the Sectoral Employment Initiative is to examine whether the sectoral
approach can be more broadly extended in the employment field. The wide distribution
of the request for proposals (RFP) uncovered several organizations new to employment
and others that were unfamiliar with sectoral strategies. In some cases, the selected
organizations planned to launch new businesses. Others intended to develop new sec-
toral employment programs. And a few decided to add systemic change components to
existing employment strategies. In nearly every case, the initiative posed large and fairly
challenging goals. When they were selected by the Mott Foundation, each grantee was
expected to get up to speed on its sectoral and programmatic efforts immediately—a
challenge that proved difficult for all 10 groups. Some decided to focus on training indi-
viduals first, while others led with systemic change efforts. Regardless of the choice, the
lack of time provided between the announcement of the RFP winners and the start of
the demonstration led to a slow start for the overall initiative.
THE STRONG ECONOMY HAS CUT BOTH WAYS
In each of the 10 regions in which these organizations operate, job growth has been an
important factor—in ways that have simultaneously helped and hurt the initiatives. On
the one hand, a shortage of labor, particularly skilled labor, has made employers much
more interested in collaborating. This situation has not only opened up jobs but has led
employers to examine their own employment practices and to join forces on public
policy issues. Manufacturers in the Cleveland area are concerned about workforce issues
because of the scarcity of machinists. Hospitals are now interested in working with Project
QUEST on investing in upgrading the skills of current staff in order to meet critical
shortages in higher-skill occupations. Demand for labor has also made policymakers
more receptive to working with the Sectoral Employment Initiative organizations in some
states. The eagerness of New Hampshire officials to work with the Loan Fund and QCP
on issues affecting the direct health care workforce reflects to no small extent their
concerns about the industry’s inability to recruit and retain sufficient employees.
While each of the organizations in the initiative has been using the strong economy to its
advantage, employment growth has also had serious consequences for recruitment and,
in some cases, attrition during training. Most of the programs that involve skills training
have had to invest more resources in recruiting participants in order to fill their classes.
Recruitment is down in large part because the easy availability of jobs satisfies potential
participants’ need for immediate income. The need for income and relative ease of find-
ing employment seem to have been factors in the high attrition affecting two long-term
training programs, ARCH and PhAME.
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT HAS BEEN IMPORTANT BUT INCONSISTENT
Public financial support for several of the 10 organizations has been crucial, while others
operate strictly with private resources. ARCH, QUEST, PhAME, Training, Inc., WIRE-Net
and GFF have been at least partly sustained with public funds. These organizations
would never have been able to mount their initiatives without such support. QUEST
and Training, Inc. have enjoyed large increases in public support as the initiative has pro-
gressed, in part because of their strong performance and, in QUEST’s case, because of
the organizational muscle of COPS and the Metro Alliance, two community organizing
groups in San Antonio. At the same time, however, changes in public policy, funding and
administration have bedeviled several of the organizations.
The change in public support that has proved most damaging was the end of
Pennsylvania’s financing of stipends for PhAME’s participants. Set initially at about
$1,000 per month, these stipends bolstered recruitment and enabled participants to
remain in training without worrying about holding down a job as well. When the stipend
ended, many PhAME participants dropped out almost immediately, while others strug-
gled to balance the demands of a rigorous full-time training program and the require-
ments of outside jobs.
The emphasis on employment and work activities for welfare recipients in Washington,
D.C., reduced ARCH’s pipeline of candidates for its paralegal training program.
Although the District of Columbia ultimately did allow welfare recipients to count
ARCH’s training as a work activity, case managers referred few people to the program.
Other administrative delays, though seemingly minor, incensed staff and participants
alike. Program participants were eligible for modest stipends of $35 per week to defray
the cost of transportation to training. Repeated delays in issuing the stipends infuriated
participants.
NECESSITY IS THE MOTHER OF INTERVENTION
Thus far, the organizations focusing on upgrading bad jobs—those with relatively low
pay and benefits—have developed clearer visions and more aggressive sectoral strategies.
Primavera, the Co-op, the GFF, the Loan Fund and WPUSA are pursuing strategies in
which their ability to help individuals is limited by the realities of the occupations they
have targeted. Unless they can improve pay, benefits and working conditions within the
targeted industries, they will be unable to make much difference in people’s economic
well-being. In essence, their work with individuals will become much more rewarding if
they can change the sector.
Of those organizations focused on jobs with decent wages and benefits—QUEST,
Training, Inc., ARCH, PhAME and WIRE-Net—only WIRE-Net has developed a strong
vision and detailed operational plan for achieving systemic changes in the sector. ARCH
and PhAME have focused on restructuring their training programs and have devoted lit-
tle time to broader changes in public policy or local labor markets. And although each
has had relatively few graduates, those who have completed training are landing jobs with
good wages and benefits. QUEST and Training, Inc., in contrast, have effective training
programs. Because both have high completion rates and their graduates are already qual-
ifying for decent jobs, they have not had to worry as much on a day-to-day basis about
changing the sector. In essence, their work with individuals is profoundly rewarding—
even without changes in the sector.
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A CLEAR VISION OF SYSTEMIC CHANGE IS NECESSARY…
Several, but by no means all, of the grantees have articulated ambitious sectoral strategies
that have generated considerable media attention and have proved useful in attracting
potential allies. WPUSA has drawn attention to the needs of low-income temporary work-
ers in Silicon Valley by documenting the concerns of these workers and outlining a com-
pelling set of initiatives designed to address those concerns. Similarly, the Loan Fund and
QCP have been able to focus media and public attention on the relationship between
better working conditions for direct care workers and the quality of health care delivered
to patients. Their vision has attracted attention from organizations and policymakers
interested in health care, workforce development and business creation. Primavera has
become a recognized voice in Tucson and in Arizona on day labor issues by drawing
attention to the ways in which standard industry practices take a toll on workers. It has
also linked service quality to the quality of industry working conditions. Though these
organizations may never fully achieve their ambitions, the commitment to dramatic
change both galvanizes staff and positions the organization to pursue opportunities and
incremental improvements that it might not otherwise have pursued.
…BUT NOT SUFFICIENT
Vision is critical to sectoral plans, but unless it is translated into concrete operational
steps and consistent, nitty-gritty follow-up, achieving change seems unlikely. The Loan
Fund’s sectoral strategy is strengthened considerably by the early promise of QCP, the
firm it launched to demonstrate the connection between quality care and quality jobs.
And it has begun taking crucial steps toward developing the relationships and position
needed to effect larger changes down the road. Similarly, the fact that Primavera has
launched its own day labor business and developed its own cadre of corporate customers
enables it to be a much more credible advocate for change within the industry.
WIRE-Net has attracted numerous allies among employers with its overarching goal of
improving the skills of the manufacturing labor force. It is translating this ambition into a
set of initiatives in which it is partnering with specific employers and educational institu-
tions to expand classes and revamp curricula. Such efforts deepen staff’s knowledge of
the sector and enable them to speak with credibility.
Though WPUSA’s vision and influence may enable it to achieve some of its sectoral
goals regardless of whether it is able to launch its staffing business, develop its workers’
association, train workers or get them health insurance, its credibility and impact will
undoubtably be greater if it successfully implements these program components.
Other organizations had not yet translated their sectoral goals into clear operational
plans by the end of the second year. ARCH and PhAME, which had anticipated changing
industry and educational practices primarily through leading by example, had little influ-
ence when their training programs performed below expectations. Nevertheless, each still
has important strengths that could be built on during the third year. PhAME continues to
have the strong support of its original industry and academic partners, and receives wide
local and national media coverage. ARCH may be able to strengthen and institutionalize
its paralegal training strategy through a nascent relationship with the University of the
District of Columbia.
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COMPETING PRIORITIES INHIBIT SECTORAL STRATEGIES
By and large, organizations in the initiative that are solely or principally committed as
organizations to effecting change in a sector have made more progress and appear generally
better positioned to affect their labor market. In contrast, those organizations for whom
the sectoral strategy is one of many organizational commitments have, in general, made
less progress. Among the 10 organizations in the initiative, the Co-op, Loan Fund, QCP,
WIRE-Net, PhAME, WPUSA and Primavera have devoted their workforce development
efforts to achieve success in a single sector. Though not all of these organizations have
been successful thus far—other factors weigh heavily, as we have described—it seems that
such single-mindedness increases the chances of impact.
SMALL MARKETS ARE MORE AMENABLE TO EARLY ACHIEVEMENTS
It appears at this stage in the Sectoral Employment Initiative that another important
determinant of whether organizations achieve significant change in their sector is the
size and complexity of the political and economic environment in which they operate.
Organizations, even those that have been start-ups or new initiatives, operating in less-
populated states and smaller labor markets, have been more likely to demonstrate early
progress in their sectoral strategies. The Loan Fund and QCP in New Hampshire, the
Co-op in Rhode Island, GFF in Arkansas and Primavera in Arizona have already had con-
siderable influence and are well positioned to effect larger changes as the third year
gets under way.
In each case, these organizations are some of the few, if not the only ones, in their 
states focused on providing better opportunities to low-income people working in a 
particular sector. Such prominence enables each to play a large role, particularly in state
policy decisions.
Despite the fact that each organization’s sectoral strategy is new, the relative simplicity
of the local labor market has enabled them to quickly assume a substantial role with
employers, educational institutions and potential recruits, which has taken the form of
business contracts and academic credit for program graduates. At the same time, operat-
ing in a small labor market leaves less room for error: organizations that develop poor
relations with key players will have no place to hide.
CONCLUSION
Preparing individuals to succeed in the workforce and affecting the operation of labor mar-
kets are each challenging propositions, particularly for new organizations or initiatives.
Doing both at the same time is a great challenge. For some organizations, it may be a mis-
take to pursue both: they may be able to do more good by focusing on one. For example, it
is not clear whether a strong training organization should reduce the number of people it
trains in order to allow program leaders to focus on systemic change. Yet the appeal of sec-
toral employment strategies is readily apparent: when organizations are able to serve peo-
ple effectively and affect local labor markets in ways that benefit other workers as well, their
overall impact can extend beyond the boundaries of traditional employment programs.
Considering the complexity of these strategies, we are cautiously optimistic about extend-
ing the sectoral employment approach to new organizations at this point in the initiative.
While one or two organizations have struggled to serve individuals effectively and some
have yet to mount systemic change strategies, others have been able to serve participants
and position themselves to effect broader policy and labor market changes. Certainly, we
will have a clearer sense of their actual accomplishments—and of the broader potential
of sectoral employment strategies—after the third and final year of the initiative.
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ENDNOTES
1 In conformance with Census Bureau definitions, noncash transfers include Food Stamps, child care subsidies
and transportation subsidies. Means-tested cash transfers include TANF, General Assistance (GA) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Nonmeans-tested cash transfers include Social Security benefits,
Unemployment Insurance and Veteran’s benefits.
2 The U.S. Census Bureau excludes capital gains and noncash income, such as Food Stamps and housing
subsidies, from its calculations of income and poverty.
3 According to the HUD guidelines, a very low-income household is one whose income is at or below 50
percent of the median income for all households in the metropolitan area.
4 Where participants had spouses or partners living in the household (29%), the figures represent the net
worth of both the participants and their spouses or partners.
5 Kennickell, Arthur, Martha Starr-McCluer, and Brian Surette. “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:
Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 86, pp. 1-29, January
2000.
6 Enrollment figures for Project QUEST and Training, Inc. do not represent total enrollment in their train-
ing programs. Figures are for QUEST’s health care track and Training, Inc.’s PC technician program only.
7 Primavera estimates the average monthly earnings of its workers to be about $525.
8 These data are for all participants, including those that were with Primavera for less than a month.
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